A Fragmented China. Measure and Determinants of Chinese Domestic Market Disintegration by Sandra PONCET
A FRAGMENTED CHINA




This paper studies the degree of integration of China’s domestic market and inves-
tigates the determinants of inter-provincial trade barriers in light of endogenous trade
policy theory.
I rely on a new set of provincial trade ﬂows to develop a model which analyzes the
magnitude and evolution of Chinese provinces’ engagement in domestic trade by comput-
ing all-inclusive indicators of trade barriers. Results underline that not only the Chinese
domestic economy is fragmented but also that local protectionism has spread between
1992 and 1997.
The investigation of province-level and industry-level trade barriers conﬁrms the rel-
evance of applying the framework of endogenous protection to explain the level of im-
pediments to trade between Chinese provinces. Our ﬁndings emphasize that provinces’
domestic trade protection pursues a dual objective of socio-economic stability preservation
and ﬁscal revenues maximization.
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model.R´ esum´ e
Ce travail´ etudie le degr´ e d’int´ egration du march´ e int´ erieur chinois et examine les d´ eterminants
des barri` eres au commerce inter-provincial ` a la lumi` ere de la th´ eorie de la protection com-
merciale endog` ene.
On se base sur des nouvelles donn´ ees de ﬂux commerciaux provinciaux pour d´ evelopper
un mod` ele qui analyse l’ampleur et l’´ evolution de l’engagement des provinces chinoises
dans les ´ echanges int´ erieurs en calculant des indicators globaux d’entraves au commerce.
Les r´ esultats soulignent non seulement que l’´ economie chinoise est fragment´ ee mais surtout
que le protectionnisme local s’est accru entre 1992 et 1997.
L’´ etude des entraves commerciales par province et par secteur conﬁrme la pertinence de
l’application de la th´ eorie de la protection endog` ene pour expliquer le niveau des entraves
entre les provinces. Nos r´ esultats mettent en ´ evidence que la protection du commerce
int´ erieur par les autorit´ es provinciales poursuit un double objectif de pr´ eservation de la
stabilit´ e socio-´ economique et de maximisation des recettes ﬁscales.
Mots cl´ es: Provinces Chinoises, int´ egration interne des march´ es, int´ egration r´ egionale,
eﬀets fronti` ere.
21 Introduction
The economic reforms initiated by Chinese authorities in the late 1970s promoted spatial domes-
tic market integration alongside state withdrawal, economic modernization and international
openness. They broke dramatically with the Maoist introverted development strategy. In
pre-reform China, the emphasis was placed on planning, autarky and regional self-suﬃciency.
China’s duplicative domestic market was referred as cellularized along the provincial borders.
Some reforms, notably trade and ﬁnancial opening to the World economy moved forward very
quickly. Achievements in internal reforms are less obvious. Speciﬁcally, some authors express
their concerns about the degree of economic integration between Chinese provinces.
The magnitude of regional integration in China and the transformation of the country into
a uniﬁed, fair and regulated market as it joins the World Trade Organization take on particular
importance, since China’s international opening can only be eﬀective if goods are traded freely
inside the country.
Relying on indirect analyses of price and provincial economic structures data, Young (2000)
makes the extreme assertion that over the past 20 years of economic reform China, has evolved
into “a fragmented internal market with ﬁefdoms controlled by local oﬃcials”. This claim was
put forward early on based on similar data by World Bank (1994)’s report on China’s internal
market development. Huang (2002) bears out the same thesis of decreasing inter-regional
economic integration.
Local protectionism is a topical issue as proven by recent declarations of top ranked oﬃcials
3and the ban of local protections by a directive of the cabinet1. It is however hard to move
beyond the anecdotes and to obtain a concrete measure of intra-national protections.
The claim of increasing fragmentation in China is received with skepticism by China’s
specialists. Reports of rising regional trade barriers run strongly counter to the perceptions
of informed observers of the Chinese economy. Notably they ﬂy in the face of the visibly
successful eﬀorts by both foreign multinationals and emerging Chinese enterprises to build
national distribution networks and establish nationally recognized brands.
Overturning conventional wisdom requires very solid empirical work. So far, papers sup-
porting the counter-intuitive thesis of decreasing integration in China suﬀer from the lack of
direct data and interpretation problems. To our knowledge, there is presently no direct study
on the degree and evolution of domestic market integration in China. Naughton (1999) does
examine inter-provincial trade ﬂow extracted from provincial input-output tables. He argues
that Chinese domestic trade is not only large, but also is dominated by intra-industry trade
in manufactured products. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view of an integrated national
economy. Naughton’s study is, however, limited to the year 1992, falling short of analyzing the
evolution of impediments to trade within China since the deepening of the reforms2.
In this paper, I assess the magnitude and evolution of Chinese market integration in the
1990s based on a new inter-provincial trade data set. I then investigate the determinants of
internal trade barriers in light of endogenous trade policy theory.
I tackle the issue of regional integration within China head on relying on an updated version
1-At the annual session of the National People’s Congress in March 2000, Wang Zhongfu, director of the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, pointed out that “administrative monopolies, forced deals
and market blockades have become a cancer in China’s market” (People’s Daily July 1st, 2000). More recently,
in April 2001, the State Council issued a directive to outlaw regional blockades in market activities.
2The author provides a tentative comparison with some data for 1987. Their inferior quality and greater
aggregation cast however doubt on the comparability of the two series.
4for 1997 of the IO data used by Naughton. I compute all-inclusive indicators of province-level
and industry-level trade barriers for 1992 and 1997 using the border eﬀects method.
The literature on border eﬀects was pioneered by McCallum (1995) to measure the trade-
diminishing eﬀects of the Canada-US border. It has been adapted to measure the degree of
integration between and within sovereign countries (Helliwell (1997) on Canada, Wolf (2000) on
the US, Wei (1996) between OECD countries and Head and Mayer (2000) on the EU). These
analyses all ﬁnd rather large border eﬀects, however declining over time, in line with increased
trade liberalization.
I apply this method to evaluate whether Chinese economic reforms were successful or not
in promoting domestic market integration.
Each province is considered an integrated economy within its boundaries while its frontiers
hinder trade ﬂow with the outside. The domestic integration of Chinese provinces is thus
evaluated using the volume of intra-provincial trade ﬂow as the reference. The trade-diminishing
eﬀect of Chinese provincial borders is measured as the “excessive” trade volume observed within
a province in relation with what would be expected from the model in absence of impediments
to trade3. The model is then modiﬁed to take into account the role of public versus private
consumption in the provincial preference for local goods.
It appears that not only the trade-diminishing impact of provincial borders is high but above
all it has increased between 1992 and 1997 in the quasi totality of provinces and industries.
This ﬁnding contrasts with results obtained on other economies (Canada, USA, European
Union, OECD). Despite the promotion of spatial integration by authorities, domestic trade
3Speciﬁcally I refer to the proportion by which a province consumes more local goods than goods from the
other provinces.
5ﬂow intensity inside China has declined between 1992 and 1997: locally produced goods supply
a growing share of the local consumption to the detriment of goods produced in the rest of the
country.
Computed border eﬀects are taken as proxies of impediments to internal trade. The study of
their determinants conﬁrms the relevance of applying the framework of endogenous protection
to explain the level of barriers to trade between Chinese provinces. On the demand side of trade
protection, provincial unemployment rate and public sector size as well as industry-level ﬁscal
contribution and labor intensity are signiﬁcant determining factor of the protection level against
imports from the rest of China. On the supply side of protection, the higher the provincial
share of public consumption and ﬁnancial autonomy, the greater the barriers on domestic trade.
Chinese local governments, whose economic powers have expanded with decentralization, pursue
a dual strategy of socio-economic instability minimization and tax revenues extraction.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 brieﬂy describes Chinese market economic frag-
mentation and presents the actors of the decision-making process of domestic trade policy.
Section 3 develops the empirical model used to measure provincial and industry-level border
eﬀects and its adaptation to take into account the impact of public consumption on trade.
Data sources and variables construction method are then presented. Section 5 measures the
magnitude of border eﬀects in China while section 6 explores their determinants.
62 Political economy of domestic trade fragmentation in
China
China’s economy is characterized by its “cellular” structure due to its horizontal principle of
economic management. It is traditionally based on a territorial or regional planning where
local authorities govern most economic activities in one geographic region across diﬀerent eco-
nomic sectors. Chinese provinces are natural entities and even political regions in that they
constitute socio-political entities. Their territories and residents are ruled by a speciﬁc power
invested with increasing administrative and political functions since the decentralization pro-
cess. The borders of the thirty-one Chinese provinces4 delimit so many separate markets. The
decentralization reforms initiated in 1980 reinforced China’s de facto economic federalism as
more regulatory responsibilities, ownership of ﬁrms, economic and ﬁnancial powers were placed
in the hands of provincial governments. Under the name of assistance to the local economy,
local governments used their heightened administrative powers (in terms of trade, investment,
budget and price ﬁxation) to implement a multiform protection of workers and enterprises un-
der their authority (Zhao and Zhang, 1999). Alright import bans, discriminatory product and
health certiﬁcation standards, tariﬀs and dumping charges, conﬁscations of proﬁts earned on
marketing foreign-provincial goods as well as subsidies to local commercial units for buying
locally-produced products aimed at curtailing competition with home-province products and
sustaining employment and the survival of uncompetitive local enterprises (Wedeman, 2002 and
Chinese Economic Studies, 1994). Local authorities often justiﬁed their protectionist measures
4China is divided into thirty-one provincial-level administrative entities. They include ﬁve autonomous re-
gions zizhiqu, twenty-two provinces sheng and since 1997 four provincial-level municipalities zhixiashi(Shanghai,
Tianjin, Beijing and Tchonqing located in Sichuan province).
7by their regional import substitution strategies. These provincial policies, just as those at the
national level, intended to develop import-replacing infant industries at home in the shelter of
trade restrictions. Duplication of under-optimal enterprises, convergence of industrial produc-
tion across diﬀerent regions, wastefulness and territorial segmentation along provincial border
logically arose.
The rough data on domestic trade from provincial Input Output Tables conﬁrm that do-
mestic trade is large but declining over the period 1992-1997. Average Chinese inter-provincial
imports amount to 50 and 38 % of GDP respectively in 1992 and 1997. Inter-provincial trade
makes up 80 and 66% of total trade in these years.
The value of internal trade in China increased between 1992 and 1997, yet at a lower rate
than GDP, international trade and intra-provincial trade. Between 1992 and 1997, the share of
imports from other provinces in total goods absorption decreased. In 1992, average provincial
absorption of goods was composed as follows: 27% of goods produced in other provinces, 68% of
locally made products and 5% of international imports. In 1997, the importance of goods from
the rest of China in provincial absorption declined to 20% while the shares of locally-produced
goods and foreign goods rose to 72 and 8%, respectively.
The decrease in inter-provincial trade intensity is consistent with the rapid international
trade opening of Chinese provinces. However, the fact that it goes hand in hand with the
rise of intra-provincial trade intensity raises doubts on eﬀective domestic market integration.
As mentioned earlier, the promotion by Chinese reforms of domestic openness alongside in-
ternational openness was motivated by the search for dynamic and static gains resulting from
increased competition, the diﬀusion of technological progress and the determination of produc-
tion according to comparative advantages. Pre-reform introverted development policies resulted
8in ineﬃcient and non-competitive local products as production completely neglected principles
of comparative advantage, economies of scale and specialization. International imports are ex-
pected to substitute both for production in other Chinese provinces (domestic trade) and for
local production (intra-provincial trade). One may expect the substitution eﬀect to be larger
for local goods than for goods for the rest of the country. In parallel, domestic integration
should also foster competition between domestic and local products, to the advantage of the
ﬁrsts.
Findings of decreasing inter-provincial trade intensity beside rising intra-provincial trade
intensity between 1992 and 1997 run counter to the logic of regional specialization according to
comparative advantages and economies of scale. They support the claim of growing economic
fragmentation in China.
The theory of endogenous trade policy is used to understand the logic of local authorities’
protectionism. It contends that governments when deciding trade policies do not only pursue
economic eﬃciency but also consider income distributional consideration. Trade protection
is endogenously determined by the relationship between a demand (from private agents and
interests groups) and a supply (from politicians and government).
Numerous empirical studies examine the political-economy determinants of trade protection
at the national level5, some of which on developing economies like South Korea, Taiwan and
Mexico. However, there are only a few applications of the endogenous trade theory to China
5Baldwin (1984) and Rodrik (1995] provide excellent surveys of this literature.
9(Branstetter and Feenstra, 19996, Chen and Feng, 20007, Bin, 2001). They focus exclusively
on international trade.
This paper oﬀers a ﬁrst attempt to investigate the determinants of trade protection adopted
internally by Chinese provinces. The logic of above-cited studies can be taken up to apprehend
provincial domestic trade protectionism. They all emphasize the importance of the objective of
economic and political stability in the trade policy management. Economic reforms highlight
the over-employment and the lack of proﬁtability of numerous enterprises especially state-owned
ones. Due to soft budget constraint and historical management failures, more than half of public
enterprises are now running a deﬁcit. Most of them are directly controlled by the authorities
of their jurisdiction. These regional enterprises (difang qiye) entertain close ties with the local
government which favor blackmailing practices and lobbying for more protection. I argue that
trade policy is used by provincial authorities as a tool to minimize threats of massive layoﬀs,
bankruptcies and reduced competitiveness of local enterprises induced by liberalization and
privatization processes. As such, protection is expected to be extended in priority to high
employment and ineﬃcient sectors. I further consider the importance of the ﬁscal revenue
objective. Indeed, previous studies on China’s international trade policy ﬁnd that trade policy
6This paper derives a model inspired from Grossman and Helpman (1994) and views the political process
in China as trading oﬀ the social beneﬁts of increased international opening against the loss incurred by state-
owned enterprises. These authors treat Chinese provinces as distinct due to the limited economic integration
between them and their trade policy autonomy.
7This paper legitimates applying endogenous trade theory to Chinese economy despite the apparent lack of
political competition among parties in the country. The authors set out three reasons to examine China’s trade
policy in the endogenous context although popular support does not seem to be needed to remain in or to gain
political oﬃce. First, high-performance record strengthens government’s legitimacy and trade policy is a tool
used by provincial authorities to ensure good results in terms of growth and employment. Second, economic
reforms create losers through massive layoﬀs, inﬂation and decreasing enterprises’ proﬁtability. Trade policy may
help to limit the competition and preserve political and social stability. Third, with the decentralization process,
new actors (enterprises, industrial associations and local governments) have emerged and gained ﬁnancial and
political power. Lobbying activities mainly take place between enterprises and authorities by the means of
persuasion, protest and bargaining. The negotiation strength of enterprises depends non only on their nature
and status but also on their network (guangxi) with competent oﬃcials.
10pursues the maximization of government revenues beside the preservation of social stability and
economic equity.
Our ﬁndings will conﬁrm the relevance of endogenous policy trade theory in the Chinese
domestic market context. They also shed light on the appropriate strategy for the central
government to undertake in order to ﬁght against local protectionism and promote domestic
market integration.
3 The border eﬀect model
3.1 Basic Model
I follow the model proposed by Head and Mayer (2000) to measure trade integration between
European countries. Their speciﬁcation is now probably the cutting-edge implementation in
that it develops the estimating equation from ﬁrst principles and takes into account that prices
of third nation goods can aﬀect bilateral trade ﬂows.
Head and Mayer (2000) adopt a monopolistic competition framework inspired by Krugman
(1980) and derive a gravity equation from a utility function allowing for asymmetric consumer
preferences.
The C.I.F. value of imports of province i from partner j, mij, is obtained through the



















with k covering all partners so that k=1, i, j,... N, σ the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties and pik, the delivery price of imports from k by i.
11I obtain the bilateral imports of i from j by summing imports for each variety, with nj is













A gravity equation is derived from this expression after taking into account the proportional-
ity njpj =
vj
q between production vj and the number of varieties nj yielded by the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) model8 in order to eliminate nj and nk terms.
The price paid by consumers in province i for goods produced in partner j is deﬁned as a
multiplicative function of production price in j, pj, the distance between the two partners dij
and trade barriers (tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ) applied by province i on its imports from j. Constant
ad valorem barriers of u are assumed for all cross-border trade so that pij=(1+u)dδ
ijpj.
Trade barriers u are supposed to be null inside provinces (j = i) but positive if i 6= j. Let
Bij be a dummy variable that equals one when trade ﬂows cross borders and zero otherwise,






















I specify aij, the preference weight of consumers in i for products imported from j9 as
composed by a domestic bias (noted DBij) and by an error term normally distributed ij :
aij=exp(DBij+ij). Let DBij = 0 when i = j (intra-provincial trade) whereas it is negative
when i 6= j so that DBij = −βi. In this latter case, consumers prefer local goods to outside
8In the model of monopolistic competition, the quantity of production (noted q) is identical for every ﬁrm.
With vj the production value in j, one obtains the equality vj = qpjnj.
9This consumer utilities speciﬁcation allows heterogeneity in bilateral preferences and enables consumers to
value products diﬀerently depending on their origin.
12goods and experience a positive aversion βi vis-` a-vis products imported from the other side of
the frontier.
I follow Head and Mayer (2000) in adopting a relative speciﬁcation to overcome estimation
problems of the denominator. The authors transform the gravity relationship into relative
terms with respect to intra-provincial trade ﬂow mii.
Substituting for all the previously deﬁned terms in the deﬁnition of mij and transforming













− (σ − 1)[βi + ln(1 + u)]+eij (4)
with eij = (σ − 1)(ij − ii)
The constant term in equation 4 is expected to be negative as it represents the deviation
of observed inter-provincial trade ﬂows from their predicted value in absence of barriers by the
model, based on intra-provincial trade. It includes the eﬀect of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers u
as well as the impact of aversion to domestic goods βi.
3.2 Considering public consumption importance
The basic equation can be enhanced through the deﬁnition of the local bias of consumption in
light of the endogenous trade policy theory. The supply of protection by a provincial government
is assumed to depend on its interventionism in the economy captured through the share of public
sector in the provincial consumption.
Equation 4 is easily modiﬁable to take into account the respective shares of the public
and private sectors in the consumption and the speciﬁc values of their domestic bias. Let
βi = β
pub
i ∗ αi + β
priv





i the aversion vis-` a-vis outside products of public and private consumers




























priv + ln(1 + u)
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+ eij
with eij = (σ − 1)(ij − ii).
The constant term (taken as a proxy of domestic trade barriers) is purged from the impact of
the public consumer’s aversion towards outside goods. It captures private consumer’s aversion
beside trade barriers. A decrease in the border eﬀect would be consistent with greater preference
for local goods from the public sector.
4 Data sources and variables construction
Most Chinese provinces produced square input output tables for 1992 and 1997. A few of them
are published in provincial statistical yearbooks. I obtained access to ﬁnal-demand columns of
these matrices from the input output division in China’s National Bureau of Statistics.
They provide the decomposition of provincial output, international and domestic trade for
21 comparable industries of tradable goods in 1992 and 199710. Domestic trade ﬂows, that is
trade between each province and the rest of China11, were obtained for 25 provinces in 1992
10In 1997, a total of 40 industries are considered against 33 in 1992. This study concentrates on industries of
tradable products and thus excludes service sectors.
11No data on bilateral trade ﬂow between provinces are available. The model will not estimate the impact of
provincial borders on trade ﬂow between provinces that they separate but the eﬀect of each province’s boundaries
on its trade with all other provinces.
14and 24 provinces in 199712.
The rest of China, denoted by roC, diﬀers for each province considered and can be thought of
as a distinct country whose characteristics (production VroC, production price proC and distance
to partners di−roC) can be generated on the basis of the characteristics of the provinces that
make it up. As such its production VroC corresponds to the sum of the productions vj of its
constitutive provinces j: VroC =
P
j6=i vj.
To avoid a somewhat ad hoc way of aggregating provincial characteristics, expressions of
other rest of China’s characteristics are derived directly from the model, on the ground that
mi−roC =
P
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The notation can be simpliﬁed in setting θ = δ(σ − 1) and in letting
γ = exp(−β + ij)
σ−1 (1 + u)














The presence of the unknown distance-decay parameter θ and the price elasticity σ inside
the summation complicates the deduction of an estimable equation. In order to avoid relying


















12IO tables are available for 28 provinces as data are missing for Tibet, Hainan and Tchongqing). Three
provinces in 1992 (Anhui, Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia) and four in 1997 (Anhui, Heilongjiang, Shandong
and Guizhou) list only net outﬂows and are thus not useful for studying inter-provincial trade. Eleven provinces
in 1992 and seven in 1997 separate inﬂows and outﬂows into domestic and foreign sectors. I have deduced
domestic trade ﬂows for the other provinces using industry-level provincial import and export data from the
General Administration of Customs. These data match the data reported as international trade by provinces
that separate international and domestic transactions in their input-output tables. This ﬁnding gives some





VroC = 1. It is true that the geometric mean always yields results inferior to those given




j is small. In our
case it is quite close to zero. In the literature, estimates of the distance elasticity of trade place θ = δ(1 − σ)
between 0.5 and 1.5 while estimates of the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ range between 6 and
11.
15In the absence of correlation between dij and pj























Transforming the relationship into relative terms with respect to intra-provincial trade ﬂow
mii, taking logarithm of this expression and letting vj∗ =
vj
vroC the share of j in the output of



















−(σ − 1)[β + ln(1 + u)] + eij, with eij = (σ − 1)(ij − ii).
It follows that the formula for the eﬀective distance between each province i and the rest of




ij of bilateral distances
dij between i and the other Chinese provinces j.
For a given industry, the average production price inside the rest of China, proC, equals




j of production prices pj in the provinces that
form the rest of China. Industry-level production prices are proxied by average wages in current
yuan extracted from provincial statistical yearbooks15. Relying on comparable data on wages as
proxy for production prices deﬁnitely constitutes a improvement from traditional estimations.
Gravity models with few exceptions completely overlook the inﬂuence of prices. When they do
not, they usually rely on data on Consumer Price Index16, that fail to provide information on
the level of prices.
























15These yearbooks provide wages for agriculture, extraction activities and industry.
16The use of wages admittedly disregards issues of capital. However it could appear quite reasonable in the
case of China. as Chinese economic activities are predominantly labor intensive. Provinces should furthermore
beneﬁt from similar access to capital as credit allocation in China is made on a national basis by a small number
of state owned banks.
16Intra-provincial industry-level trade ﬂows mii are measured following Wei (1996)’s method,
that is by subtracting the province’s total exports (to domestic and foreign partners) from
production for each industry17.
Moreover, I elaborate a measure of intra-provincial distance that solves the various draw-
backs of methods used so far in the literature and has the advantage of not only being derived
directly from the model but also to take into consideration the province-speciﬁc distribution of
economic activities.
Intra-provincial distance dii is computed consistently with the model without relying on
arbitrary values of θ. It is the production-weighted geometric mean of bilateral distances










lm . The appendix explains more in
detail the computing logic and hypotheses.
Distances between provinces and prefectures are measured on the basis of real distance
by road in kilometers between their capital cities. They are computed following the shortest
itinerary and the most rapid roads based on very detailed maps. This method helps to con-
trol for the fact that quality of transport infrastructures varies enormously across and within
provinces. The introduction of distance under a logarithmic form allows to take into account
the decreasing marginal cost of distance on trade.
Sectoral heterogeneity in the response of trade to transport costs and production prices
(proxied by distance and wages respectively) will be considered in the empirical estimation.
17The production that remains within the local boundaries (not exported) is at the same time equal to imports
“from itself ” and exports “to itself ”. Intra-provincial trade is thus to be calculated as : gross value of goods
production minus international and domestic exports of goods for each industry.
18In China, provinces are sub-divided into prefectures. Data on GDP of prefectures are taken from Cities
China 1949-1998. Bilateral distances between prefectures l and m are measured on the basis of real distance
by road in kilometers between their capital cities.
175 Domestic border eﬀects estimation
I apply the basic model of border eﬀects (equation 4) to the Chinese context to estimate the level
and evolution of its domestic market integration. Industry-level and province-level all-inclusive
summaries of inter-provincial trade barriers are computed for 1992 and 1997.
Results are reported in table 1. Columns 1 to 3 correspond to a panel speciﬁcation with
industry-based ﬁxed eﬀects where a time dummy variable diﬀerentiates between 1992 and 1997.
While column 1 imposes a common coeﬃcient on the various explanatory variables, column 2
allows for sectoral heterogeneity. Column 3 goes further and introduces coeﬃcients by year and
industry.
Next columns (4 and 5) opt for a panel speciﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects by couple of industry-
year19. This speciﬁcation does not allow anymore to observe readily the 1992-1997 change in
the border eﬀect.
The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used to correct potential heteroskedas-
ticity. The Davidson-MacKinnon test does not reject the null hypothesis of absence of endo-
geneity of production20.
Coeﬃcients are quite consistent with their predicted values. The test of linear hypothesis
does not reject that the coeﬃcient on distance corresponds to the -0.6 considered by Leamer
(1997) as the normal elasticity. The coeﬃcient on relative production is close, though signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent, from its theoretical unitary value.
19The Breusch Pagan test (Lagrange multiplier test) underlines the presence of speciﬁc industry-level eﬀects
that vary in time.
20Output and trade are jointly determined in equilibrium (Harrigan, 1996). This could lead to a correlation
between relative production and the error term. Lagged production and number of employees by industry and
province are used as instruments. The test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the validity of the
choice of instruments.
18The good performance of the relative price variable can be underlined. Its coeﬃcient,
representing −σ, the substitution elasticity between varieties, though lower than the theoretical
prediction (between -5 and -10 according to diﬀerent estimation methodologies) is far superior
to that obtained by studies based on the model of Head and Mayer (2000) on the EU. This
econometric result can be explained by the fact that the analysis is centered on sub-units of a
given country. Production prices are labeled in the same currency, with no need of exchange
rate conversion like in international studies.
The constant term in the model corresponds to the average border eﬀect in Chinese domestic
market. The border eﬀect between a province and the rest of China can be interpreted as the
impeding-impact of the province’s boundaries on its trade with all the other Chinese provinces
taken as a whole. I quantify border eﬀects following McCallum (1995) in using the ratio of
imports from self to imports from others, holding other things equal. This consists in taking
the exponential value of the estimated border eﬀects. I will attach less importance to the
interpretation of the measured impact of provincial borders on domestic trade than to the
analysis of its evolution over time and its inter-industry and inter-provincial variability.
Results in columns 1 to 3 show that the average border eﬀect (across provinces and indus-
tries) rose signiﬁcantly between 1992 and 1997. This ﬁnding is robust in speciﬁcations that
authorize speciﬁc responses of trade to traditional gravity forces (output, distance and price)
by industry and industry cross year. The increase in trade impediments within China appears
even more signiﬁcant when coeﬃcients are allowed to vary by year (column 3) .
This ﬁnding of rising internal trade barriers inside China is conﬁrmed by results in the
following columns (panel with ﬁxed eﬀects by industry and year) when the average border
eﬀect that appears in the column is diﬀerentiated depending on the year. Speciﬁcation of
19column 4 is taken as the reference. The average border eﬀect is equal to exp(3.25) over the
period. It increases from 22 [exp(3.09)] in 1992 to 30 [exp(3.39)] en 1997. Thus, after controlling
for transport costs, production and production price, Chinese provinces turn out to consume
around 22 times more locally-produced goods than goods from the rest of China in 1992 against
30 times more in 1997, across industries.
The border eﬀect level can be made more explicit through its expression in tariﬀ-equivalent.
The estimate of the ad-valorem value of the border eﬀect is computed as exponential of [border
eﬀect/(σ −1)]-1. This computation requires an assumption about the elasticity of substitution
σ. Relying on σ = 9 21, I ﬁnd that the tariﬀ-equivalent of crossing a border between a province
and the rest of the country amounts to 47 and 52% in 1992 and 1997 respectively. These ﬁgures
lie close to the value of 45% found for the European Union and the Canada-US border in the
beginning of the 1990s.
The trade impeding impact of provincial borders in China turns out to be closer to that
of borders existing between independent sovereign countries than to that measured between
sub-national regions inside individual countries. Studies on internal trade in US and Canada
ﬁnd tariﬀ-equivalents inferior to 15%. Integration between diﬀerent countries is slowed down
by their nationalism, by the heterogeneity of their institutions, norms and legislations as well
as by linguistic and cultural diﬀerences between them. These factors should not be at work or
should have a lower impact on trade in a single uniﬁed country. Identical tariﬀ-equivalents in
China and in the EU during the 1990s correspond to a lower market integration achievement
in China than in Europe and thus emphasize the fragmentation of Chinese economy. More
21Head and Ries (2002) ﬁnd values of σ ranging between 7 and 11. Head and Mayer (2000) rely on σ = 9 and
ﬁnd a tariﬀ-equivalent between 37 and 45% for European countries. Wei (1996) computes a tariﬀ-equivalent of
the border eﬀect between OECD countries using σ = 20 because of the predominance of intra-industry trade in
the trade ﬂow of these countries. He ﬁnds a tariﬀ-equivalent of 5%.
20importantly, the rise of domestic border eﬀects between 1992 and 1997 contrasts with results
obtained for other trade zones. They all evidence decreasing internal trade barriers coherent
with their engagement in trade liberalization agreements. The increasing deviation between the
observed and expected domestic trade ﬂow inside China proves the failure of Chinese authorities
to promote domestic openness and crush economic structure fragmentation along the provincial
limits. It supports the thesis of a move towards the disintegration of China’s domestic market.
Locally produced goods supply a growing share of the local consumption to the detriment of
goods produced in the rest of the country. This evolution runs counter to the logic of regional
specialization according to comparative advantages and economies of scale.
I proceed to check the pertinence of the analysis of domestic trade in China in terms of
endogenous trade policies. Column 5 estimates equation 5 of the model after distinguishing be-
tween public and private consumption bias. I introduce public sector’s share in total provincial
consumption22. The greater this share, the more protectionist the province should be. Indeed,
public authorities and thus the state sector are expected to be more sensitive to the concept
of local market protection. State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) are traditionally more inclined to
give priority to a local supply against foreign imports and to follow discriminatory practices
within the framework of investments, tenders or market allocation. The importance of the
public sector consumption also proxies the magnitude of governmental interventionism in the
provincial economy. Greater public sector consumption corresponds to a less advanced stage of
state withdrawal. The expected sign on this variable is negative as public enterprises are more
inclined to call for trade protectionism and to discriminate against imports of goods from the
22This variable only has a provincial dimension since information on public consumption with the double
dimension province/industry do not exist. It is extracted from the China Statistical yearbooks.
21rest of the country. After the share of public sector consumption is introduced in the regression,
the domestic bias included in the average border eﬀect only captures that of the private sector.
It logically turns out smaller. The decomposition between public and private consumption re-
duces the border from exp(3.25) (column 4) to exp(2.59) (column 5). These results conﬁrm the
negative impact of the inﬂuence of the state in the economy on domestic market integration.
Symmetrically, it proves how privatization and the withdrawal of the state may promote the
reduction of impediments to inter-provincial trade.
The dissociation of yearly average border eﬀects between industry-level and province-level
yearly eﬀects sheds light on the spatial and industry-based disparities of impediments to inter-
provincial trade. It should improve our undertanding of this move towards domestic disin-
tegration in China. Industry-level border eﬀects correspond to the ﬁxed eﬀects of the panel
regression (column 4). The yearly provincial border eﬀects are retrieved by regressing the sum
of the yearly global border eﬀect and residual from the panel equation on the entire set of
dummy variables of couple province-year. The value of the coeﬃcient speciﬁc to each province
cross year is the speciﬁc border eﬀect for a given province and a given year. P-values are
deduced from standard errors of the regression.
Industry- and province-level border eﬀects appear in table 2.
This industry-level border eﬀects hierarchy is quite logical since Chinese domestic market
is found to be the least integrated for goods that are either diﬃcult to transport (building
materials, power and water) or that have been involved in trade conﬂicts reported in the litera-
ture. Inter-provincial trade tensions and protectionist policies concerned in priority agricultural
goods and light low technology industrial goods subject to regional import substitution strate-
gies such as metal product. The four highest increases of industry-level border eﬀects are found
22in wood products and furniture, food processing, non metal minerals extraction (wood, salt,
stone...) and metal products industries. These results are in line with provincial strategies of
import-substitution, maximal exploitation of their natural resources and on site transformation
conducted by local authorities.
On the opposite, greater inter-provincial trade intensity is observed for goods which produc-
tion is localized in a limited number of provinces, notably because of high technological content
and capitalistic intensity (petroleum reﬁning, metal smelting and electronic and telecommuni-
cations). Other provinces are bound to get their supplies from outside their borders for these
goods.
The hierarchy of yearly provincial border eﬀects also appears consistent with provinces
features and proﬁles stated in various studies (Goodman and Segal, 1994, Yang, 1997 and
Cheung, Chung and Lin, 1998) and in stories on trade tensions. Lowest border eﬀects and
thus higher economic integration with the rest of the territory are found for coastal provinces
of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Hebei, Jilin province and for two municipalities (Shanghai and
Tianjin). These two provincial-level cities are two important harbors and privileged exchange
places (stock exchange in Shanghai). In China, the coastal dimension not only encompasses
more developed transport infrastructure but also higher engagement in economic liberalization
and restructuring. Our results conﬁrm that more liberalized coastal provinces logically display
lower impediments to trade.
Landlocked and depressed western provinces are characterized by greater impediments im-
posed on their imports from the rest of the nation: Qinghai, Yunnan, Shanxi and Ningxia
provinces consume at least 40 times more local goods than goods imported from other provinces
even after transport costs, wage and wealth diﬀerences (that is four times more than the coastal
23provinces mentioned above). These interior resources-rich provinces suﬀered greatly from dis-
torted central policies (undervalued raw materials prices, preferential taxation for the coast,
investment and reforms biased in favor of coastal regions). They resorted to autarchic policies
(import substitution and protectionism) to make up for the perceived unfairness and developed
their own transformation industries in the shelter of trade restrictions.
Coastal province of Fujian as well as its neighbor Zhejiang also distinguish themselves by
high impediments to domestic imports. These features can probably be explained by geograph-
ical and cultural factors. These mountainous provinces are bordered in the north and south
respectively by the high chain of Wuxi Shan, so that Fujian is physically isolated from the rest
of China, all the more that until recently no railway line connected Fujian and neighboring
Guangdong. Huge disparities divide these two provinces into a liberalized and high-growth
coastal fringe and an autarkic and remote mountainous inside. Fujian and Zhejiang actively
participated to trade conﬂicts on various goods such as the “silkworm cocoon war” and “grain
war” that occurred at the end of the eighties. They resorted to various protectionist measures
to protect their home products from the competition of goods from their dynamic neighbors
(Guangdong for Fujian and Shanghai for Zhejiang). Long (1994) moreover argues that the
proximity with Taiwan has played against market integration with the rest of China. The long
ban on ties with the enemy island induced poverty and tension in the neighboring Chinese
provinces that tend to explain that they resorted as numerous interior provinces to protection-
ist measures. Furthermore, when trade was ﬁnally allowed between Fujian and Zhejiang and
their natural partner Taiwan, it may have developed at the expense of exchanges with other
provinces.
246 Determinants of domestic border eﬀects
This section studies the causes of the lack of integration of Chinese domestic market. De-
terminants of inter-provincial and inter-industry heterogeneity of domestic trade barriers are
successively investigated through the direct regression of yearly provincial and industry-level
border eﬀects presented in previous section. Provincial domestic protectionism is apprehended
under the rubric of endogenous policy theory as detailed in section 2.
Column 1 of table 3 introduces the provincial rate of total budgetary expenses to GDP, the
lagged rate of unemployment and the share of public sector in total consumption as explanatory
variables of provincial border eﬀects in 1992 and 199723. The Davidson-MacKinnon test does not
reject the absence of double causality between provincial trade barriers and ﬁscal autonomy24.
This regression considers a factor of demand for protection (pressure from the unemployed)
beside a supply factor (ﬁnancial and economic autonomy of authorities). The importance of
the public sector in provincial consumption can be perceived at the same time as a supply
force -reﬂecting the interventionist strategy of the authorities- and as a demand variable -
corresponding to the weight of the public sector in the local economy. I have already mentioned
that SOE are the most endangered by the liberalization process due to their chronic over-
employment, low or negative proﬁts rates and lack of competitiveness. Provincial authorities are
thus compelled to protect their activities if bankruptcy and layoﬀs are to be avoided. Moreover
SOE’s privileged direct links with local powers facilitate lobbying pressures and blackmailing
practices for greater tariﬀs protection.
23Budgetary and extra-budgetary expenses statistics are extracted from the New China 50 Year’s Government
Finance Statistics and the China Statistical Yearbooks. Unemployment and active population data are from
the 1990 and 1995 population surveys.
24Lagged value of the indicator of ﬁscal autonomy as well as provincial surface area and population density
are used as instruments. Their validity is not rejected by the test of overidentifying restrictions.
25The rate of provincial total budgetary expenditures on GDP is held as a indicator of ﬁnancial
autonomy and economic control of the provincial government and thus indicates its ability to
intervene in the economy despite central directives.
The lagged rate of unemployment constitutes another important motive for local govern-
ments to resort to protectionism. If China’s economic reforms aimed at maximizing economic
growth through marketization and privatization, massive layoﬀs ensued from increased com-
petition. This new phenomenon represents a threat for local governments as it induces social
unrest and loss of legitimacy. Trade protectionism may be considered as a way for provincial
authorities to limit liberalization adjustments costs, reduce competition of more competitive
outside products and curb unemployment growth.
Findings emphasize the positive link between greater provincial budgetary autonomy and
higher barriers to inter-provincial trade. They conﬁrm the dominant view in the studies of
Chinese economy that attributes the rise of local protectionism and local substitution policies
to the economic reforms that assigned greater ﬁscal ﬂows and economic control to regional
governments.
Zhao and Zhang (1999) describe the disastrous economic impact of decentralization reforms
in China: “Fiscal decentralization has created conditions that encourage regionalism: disap-
pearance of the traditional umbrella, unfairness to the poor regions, territorial segmentation
and confrontation, central-local vertical confrontation, and failure of spatial programs of spe-
cialization and corporation”.
Empirical results moreover conﬁrm the causality existing between past employment rate
and current protection of local economy from outside competition behind trade barriers. The
more a province suﬀered from massive layoﬀs, the more the authorities are prompt to provide
26protection to local activities.
Large adjustment costs (unemployment and bankruptcies of SOE), local activities economic
vulnerability as well as the intervention capacity of authorities through ﬁscal expenses and pub-
lic consumption turn out to be major determinants of inter-province heterogeneity of barriers
on domestic trade. These three factors explain 29% of inter-provincial border eﬀects variability.
Column 2 of table 3 studies the causal structure of inter-industry heterogeneity of impedi-
ments to domestic trade in China. High labor intensity25 and ﬁscal contribution of an industry26
positively inﬂuence the level of protection it is granted from local authorities. Protection levels
enjoyed by industries appear to be directly related to their intensity in terms of employment.
A large number of workers by production unit secures more inﬂuence in the decision-making
process of domestic trade policy for an industry. It also ensures a greater attention from au-
thorities, whether their priority is to minimize short-run adjustment costs, limit social inequity
or garner maximum political support to maintain political stability. Since the labor intensity
variable corresponds to the inverse of labor productivity, it is consistent with the fact that au-
thorities protect in priority low-productivity industries which not only require more protection
to survive increasing competition but also often lie under direct governmental control.
Additionally, governments tend to favor those industries that generate larger tax income.
Chen and Feng (2000) evidence the same strategy in the context of international trade protec-
tion and stress that setting a higher tariﬀ for an industry that is able to generate higher taxes
is a “win-win game” for the authorities and the industry.
Domestic trade policy in China appears to be largely determined by two concerns of provin-
25Industry-level labor intensity is the number of worker per unit of production.
26This variable is computed as net taxes on production of the considered industry divided by total net taxes
through industries.
27cial authorities. The ﬁrst concern stems from the governments’ need to protect vulnerable
and labor intensive enterprises (typically state-owned units). Higher domestic trade barriers
are thus observed in provincial economies where the public sector plays a major role, where
past unemployment rate is high and in sectors characterized by high labor intensity and low
productivity. This strategy is all the critical to avoid political unrest and social chaos that
the province is already crippled by a high unemployment rate. The second concern has to do
with ﬁscal revenues extraction. In a context of ﬁscal decentralization, local governments tend
to protect in priority big tax payers to maximize their intervention power.
7 Conclusion
This study applies the border eﬀects method on a unique dataset of industry-level domestic
trade ﬂows between Chinese provinces to measure domestic market integration in China in
1992 and 1997. Our results underline the fragmentation of Chinese domestic economy and even
the spread of local protectionism over the period. Rather than a single market, China appears
as a collection of separate regional economies protected by barriers. These ﬁndings question
China’s future WTO compliance. International tariﬀs reduction does not secure free access
to Chinese domestic market if provincial authorities maintain and even extend restrictions on
inter-provincial trade.
The investigation of province-level and industry-level trade barriers conﬁrms the relevance
of applying the framework of endogenous protection to explain the level of impediments to
trade between Chinese provinces. Empirical results emphasize that provinces’ domestic trade
protection pursues a dual objective of socio-economic stability preservation and ﬁscal revenues
maximization.
28Provincial barriers to domestic trade aim at minimizing the negative social, economic and
political impacts of privatization and liberalization programs (layoﬀs, bankruptcies, declining
proﬁts...). Local protectionism thus occurs in the context of large economic autonomy of local
authorities, high past unemployment rate, large public sector and high labor intensity industries.
The second objective concerns the extraction of tax revenues. Local authorities that gained
substantial economic powers from the decentralization process are inclined to protect those
industries that generate large tax income.
As far as political implications are concerned, if economic reforms can favor the reduction of
internal barriers through the reduction of the public sector and the search of productivity gains,
their disrupting eﬀects (layoﬀs, losses of ineﬃcient SOE, declining proﬁts) put in movement
destabilizing forces that impede domestic trade integration. Chinese central government faces
great challenges in order to comply to WTO rules and promote domestic market integration. It
has to strike a balance between economic reforms and inherent adjustments costs and to limit
local governments economic interventionism.
29APPENDIX
The estimation of internal trading distance has become the key issue in the border eﬀects
literature. Internal distance within an economic territory can be thought as the average trading
distance between two random points in this territory. The averaging procedure should however
be consistent with the gravity model. Equation 5 of the empirical model determines that
gravity forces not only work between Chinese provinces and their outside partners but also
inside Chinese provinces. Speciﬁcally, intra-provincial trade declines with the intra-provincial
distance dii the same way that interprovincial trade declines with the inter-provincial distance.
Several approaches to measure within-unit distances currently coexist in the border eﬀects
literature27. I argue that none of the methods used so far to compute internal distances is
appropriate since none is derived in a manner consistent with the gravity trade model. The
model imposes a constant distance elasticity of trade θ that should be taken into account when
calculating the average distance between two points. Simple average or production-weighted
average of distances between sub-sets is not appropriate.
I develop a correct measure of intra-provincial distance directly derived from the gravity-like
trade model without relying on arbitrary values of θ. The province i corresponds to a set of
points. Let l and m be located in the province i. The average intra-provincial distance dii can
be derived from the expression of mii in equation 3 of the model through the following two-step
27Initial papers (Wolf, 2000 and Wei, 1996) employ fractions of distances to the capital cities of neighbor
countries. A second strand in the literature assumes that the country has a speciﬁc geographic shape and a
speciﬁc spatial distribution of the activity in order to calculate the average distance among points within the
country. If a disk-shape is assumed, the average distance will be a fraction of
p
surface area/π. A third and
more desirable method relies on actual data on the spatial distribution of economic activity within the country
rather than on approximations. Notably, Helliwell and Verdier (2001) calculate internal distances of Canadian
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The ﬁrst hypothesis I make is that for every point l in the province i, its share in the total




























At this point of the research, I accept a simpliﬁcation about V Il. V Il incorporates the
inﬂuence of characteristics of all potential suppliers k of importer l such as their economic
size, distance and border eﬀect. Potential suppliers k include suppliers from the province i
and suppliers from the outside (rest of China and international partners). In the case of the
suppliers k from outside the province, I can assume that the inﬂuence of their characteristics
relative to l is equal to their inﬂuence relative to c with c being the center of the province i. As
a matter of fact, I hypothesize that V Il is the same for every l of the province i and is equal to
V Ic.
31Moreover I consider that the inﬂuence of characteristics of intra-provincial suppliers can be
neglected compared to the inﬂuence of characteristics of outside partners28. I have expressed
V Il in a manner independent of l but dependent on the center c of the province i. In fact, I
have considered that V Il is an approximation to V Ii.
































28International and interprovincial distances between the center of the province and outside partners are
far greater than distances between two points of the province dlk if k∈i. The same is true for the production
value: the production of any international partner is far higher than the production of a point k in the province
vk if k∈i. Moreover the ‘international’ component of V Il incorporates multiplicative positive terms (alk and
Blk (1 + u)) that do not exist in the ‘local’ component.
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35Table 1
measure of domestic border effects in china
Dependent Variable : ln(
mij
mii)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel
Fixed Eﬀects by industry industry-year
Border Eﬀect -3.14∗∗∗ -2.91∗∗∗ -2.34∗∗∗ -3.25∗∗∗ -2.59∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.29) (0.39) (0.27) (0.33)
rel. Production 0.81∗∗∗ by by year & 0.81∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.03) industry industry (0.03) (0.03)
rel. Distance -0.48∗∗∗ by by year & -0.49∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.13) industry industry (0.13) (0.13)
rel. Price -1.27∗∗∗ by by year & -1.32∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗
(0.30) industry industry (0.44) (0.30)
Year 1997 -0.31∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.58)
% public sector -2.42∗
consumption (1.4)
Obs. Nb. 987 987 987 987 987
R squared 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.40
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses,
with ∗∗∗ and ∗ denoting the signiﬁcance at 1 and 10% level.
36Table 2
domestic border effects by importing province and industry
by industry border eﬀects by province border eﬀects
1992 1997 1992 1997
Electricity & hot water -5.8*** -5.5*** East:
Agriculture -4.4*** -5.0*** Beijing -3.0*** -3.3***
Building Materials -4.0*** -4.3*** Tianjin -2.4** -2.9***
Metal products -3.7*** -4.5*** Hebei -1.7 -1.6***
Paper and printing -3.4*** -3.4*** Shanghai -1.9 -2.8***
Coal mining -3.3*** -4.0*** Jiangsu -1.1 -1.7
Oil extraction -3.3*** -2.6*** Zhejiang -3.5*** -4.6***
Sawmills and furniture -3.2*** -4.0*** Fujian -4.6*** -6.3***
Textile -3.1*** -3.3*** Shandong -3.2*** n.d.
Apparel -3.0*** -3.1*** Guangdong -1.9 -1.7
Electric equip. & machinery -3.0*** -3.1*** Guangxi -3.0*** -2.7***
Instruments -2.9*** -2.8*** Liaoning -2.8*** -3.0***
Food manufacture -2.8*** -3.6*** Center:
Non-ferrous mineral mining -2.7*** -3.4*** Shanxi -4.3*** -4.3***
Transport equip. -2.7*** -3.0*** Jilin -1.4 -2.4***
Machinery & equip. -2.6*** -2.7*** Jiangxi -3.3*** -2.9***
Chemicals -2.5*** -3.0*** Henan -2.8*** -3.3***
Metal ore mining -2.3*** -3.0*** Hubei -2.3* -3.2***
Oil processing & Coking -2.3*** -2.7*** Hunan -2.6*** -3.1***
Metals smelting & pressing -2.3*** -2.5*** I. Mongolia n.d. -3.5***









Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses,
with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denoting the signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% level.
37Table 3
provincial and industry-level determinants of border effects




Constant -8.93*** Constant -8.08***
(1.44) (1.37)
1997 dummy 0.34 1997 dummy -0.70**
(0.32) (0.29)
Ln Fiscal Autonomy -0.81* Ln Labor -0.44***
(0.45) Intensity (0.14)
Ln Unemployment Rate -0.92** Ln Fiscal -0.12*
(0.41) Contribution (0.06)
Ln Importance of Public -0.85**
Consumption (0.39)
Number of Observations 49 42
R squared 0.29 0.21
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses,
with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denoting signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
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